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Abstract 
The duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of the efficiency of a 
court system. We use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels convicted by the 
European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the determinants of the duration 
of the subsequent one- or two-stage appeals process. We find that while the speed of the first-
stage appellate court decision depends on the court’s appeals-related workload, the 
complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved and the clarity of the 
applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court proceedings appear to be 
largely unaffected by those drivers. We take our empirical results to derive conclusions for 
both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public policy makers.    
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1. Introduction 
The enforcement of anti-cartel laws has become a major activity of many competition 
authorities around the world. For example, since the 1990s, the European Commission (EC) 
has implemented (and revised) a leniency program,1 completed a major reform of the fine 
guidelines,2 promoted the private enforcement of anti-cartel laws3 and intensified cooperation 
between competition authorities in the fight against particularly international cartels. 4
 Although the efforts of the Commission are clearly reflected in an increase in the number 
of convicted cartels – showing a rise from 10 cases in the 1995 to 1999 period, to 30 cases in 
the 2000 to 2004 period and to 33 cases in the 2005 to 2009 period – the much more dramatic 
change refers to the increase in fines imposed. According to the statistics published by the 
European Commission itself,5 the sum of fines imposed (adjusted for court judgments) shows 
an increase from € 0.271 billion in the 1995 to 1999 period to € 3.2 billion in the 2000 to 2004 
period and to € 8.2 billion in the 2005 to 2009 period. In relation to the number of firm 
groups6 fined, these numbers correspond to an increase in the average fine per firm group 
from € 6.02 million in the 1995 to 1999 period, to € 20.11 million in 2000 to 2004 and to € 
39.91 million in the most recent five-year period from 2005 to 2009.   
 Given the substantial increase in especially the average fine per firm group, it appears 
likely that firms detected and convicted for cartelization by the EC are under increased 
pressure by both share- and stakeholders. As a consequence, they are likely to have rising 
incentives to override a (possibly erroneous or disproportionate) EC decision by filing an 
appeal with the General Court of the European Union as first-stage appellate court or 
subsequently with the European Court of Justice as the second-stage and highest appellate 
court in the European Union. Interestingly, comparing the recent numbers of first-stage 
appeals in European cartel cases show a significant increase from 95 appeals in the 2000 to 
2004 period to 181 appeals in the 2005 to 2009 period; or in relative terms: while only about 
                                                          
1  A leniency program generally offers law infringers (i.e., natural persons or firms) either a fine reduction of 
even full amnesty from fines if they disclose an infringement to the responsible authority and (fully) 
cooperate with it in the subsequent investigation. For anti-cartel law infringements, the EC introduced a 
(corporate) leniency program in 1996 followed by a substantial revision in 2002. Four years later, in 2006, 
the current form of the so-called leniency notice was released after a public consultation. 
2  See Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 210, 1 September 2006, pp. 2-5. 
3  See, e.g., EC press release, Commission proposes legislation to facilitate damage claims by victims of 
antitrust violations, 11 June 2013. 
4  A substantial part of such international cooperation is organized via the International Competition Network 
(ICN). See also the Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities, 
Official Journal of the European Union, C 101, 27 April 2004. 
5  Data source: European Commission (2014), Cartel Statistics (situation as of 2 April 2014), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf (last accessed on 20 May 2014). 
6  Firms within one group are linked through ownership and are jointly liable for cartel fines.  
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57 percent of all convicted firm groups decided to appeal against an EC decision in the 2000 
to 2004 period, the corresponding value increased to about 86 percent in the 2005 to 2009 
period suggesting a substantially increased relevance of the appeals process in European 
cartel cases. 
 Assuming that the duration of appellate court proceedings is an important determinant of 
the efficiency of a court system, we use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels 
convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the 
determinants of the duration of the subsequent one- or two-stage appeals process. We find that 
while the speed of the first-stage appellate court decision depends on the court’s appeals-
related workload, the complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved 
and the clarity of applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court proceedings 
appear to be largely unaffected by those drivers. We take our empirical results to derive 
conclusions for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public policy makers. 
 The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The following second section 
provides a brief characterization of the appeals process in general and the appeals process in 
European cartel cases in particular. Subsequently, the third section develops key hypotheses 
on the determinants of the duration of the appeals process in cartel cases by differentiating 
between five sets of explanatory variables: authority-related, court-related, appeals-related, 
fine-related and group-related. In the fourth section, we present our empirical analysis. While 
Section 4.1 characterizes our empirical model, the subsequent Section 4.2 describes the 
construction of the data set and presents the corresponding descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 
then follows with a presentation and discussion of our estimation results before Section 4.4 
closes the fourth section with the derivation of several implications for both firms that plan to 
file an appeal as well as public policy makers. The fifth section concludes the article by 
summarizing its main results and providing several avenues for future research.  
 
2. The appeals process and its implementation in European cartel cases  
In this section, we provide a brief characterization of the appeals process as such 
complemented by a discussion on the importance of its duration for both firms and public 
policy makers. Subsequently, we introduce the appeals process applied in EU competition law 
in general and EC cartel cases in particular.  
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2.1. The appeals process  
It is reasonable to assume that any decision by a court (or public authority) is made under 
uncertainty with both sides presenting their best cases and the court finally rendering a 
decision in favor of one side or the other. According to Miceli ((2009), p. 259), the best the 
court will be able to do is ‘… to assess a probability that each side’s version of the facts is 
true’. In rendering a decision, the court is typically also committed to interpret existing laws 
and regulations as these are often – by construction – not deterministic but leave (at least) 
some discretion to the court.  
 The appeals process offers the losing party the possibility to seek reconsideration of their 
arguments – possibly leading to a diverging decision by an appellate court.7 Without denying 
its important constitutional role or possibly even status as a human right (see, e.g., Nobles and 
Schiff (2002)), we will assume in the following that the implementation of an appeals process 
is motivated by two main goals. First, appeals help to refine existing laws and regulations; not 
only by assessments of experienced appellate courts enriching existing case law (and guiding 
lower courts in future decisions) but also by providing signals to lawmakers on the efficiency 
of existing laws and regulations (see, e.g., Cooter and Ulen (2000)). If, for example, the 
application of a certain law or regulation is frequently followed by an unusually large amount 
of appeals, a publication of guidelines or even a review of the respective provision is 
suggested to increase procedural efficiency.   
 Second, the implementation of an appeals process aims at reducing the occurrence of legal 
errors. According to Shavell (1995), the appeals process can be viewed as a tool to correct 
errors because, first, parties are more likely to file an appeal if the first decision was erroneous 
(i.e., the act of initiating a (costly) appeal provides additional information on the (increased) 
likelihood of an erroneous decision). Second, the existence of an appeals process provides 
incentives to lower court judges to avoid erroneous decisions in the first place; basically 
because they become aware that errors may be uncovered by the higher court as part of an 
                                                          
7  From a law perspective, it is important to differentiate between the appeals process and the judicial review 
process (see, e.g., Schweitzer (2013) for a discussion of the latter with respect to EU competition law). 
Technically, the appeals process focuses on decisions by lower courts who are reassessed by higher courts on 
the merits of the decision under appeal while the judicial review process concentrates on assessments of 
decisions by a public authority (e.g., the European Commission or a national competition authority) by one or 
two court levels who will focus on the legality of the decision under review only. While important from a 
legal perspective, the economic implications of a differentiation between both processes must be considered 
as rather minor thereby justifying our approach to simply use the term ‘appeals process’ in the remainder of 
this article. In this respect, it is interesting to add that appeals mechanisms are also used in much wider 
contexts such as religious bodies, commercial trade organizations or professional sports leagues (see Shavell 
(1995), p. 380) thereby increasing the relevance of our empirical analysis further. 
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appeal thereby damaging their reputation and career prospects (see, e.g., Shavell (2006), Levy 
(2005) or Chopard et al. (2014)).      
 Given these key motivations for the implementation of an appeals process, its actual design 
offers various degrees of freedom. In addition to rather general questions such as, first, who 
should have the right to initiate an appeal (e.g., the litigants themselves and/or the appellate 
court) and, second, in what time period after the initial court decision may an appeal be 
initiated, more specific questions include, third, whether the respective appellate court is 
committed to accept the case for investigation (an appeal ‘as of right’) or whether it can reject 
it (as part of a ‘discretionary review’; see Cooter and Ulen (2000), p. 418); fourth, whether it 
has to make an entirely new judgment on the case (‘de novo appeals’) or is restricted to a 
review of the old decision based on either ‘facts and law’ or ‘law only’ as part of the appeals 
process; or, fifth, whether the decision of the first-stage appellate court is final or could be 
challenged by a second-stage appellate court (the so-called ‘finality decision’)?   
 Although it is above the scope of this article to provide a full review of answers given by 
various – largely theoretical8 – research articles (see generally Shavell (1995, 2010) or more 
specifically Daughety and Reinganum (2000)), it appears straightforward that an answer to 
the question of an optimal design of an appeals process depends on a detailed assessment of 
the (incremental) costs and benefits of various alternative designs. 9  In this respect, for 
example, Shavell (1995) argues that – due to convex costs of avoiding legal errors – it is 
socially preferable to have a two-stage (less accurate) appeals process rather than a one-stage 
(more accurate) process. Furthermore, in an older contribution, Martineau (1984) questions 
the assumption that appeals always follow welfare-enhancing motivations and signal an 
increased likelihood of an erroneous decision. He argues that appeals may also be initiated for 
frivolous reasons; i.e., parties file (and/or delay) appeals for tactical reasons and not because 
                                                          
8  The existing empirical literature on the appeals process appears to be small and fragmented. While a very 
limited number of studies focus on assessments of the determinants of filing an appeal (see, e.g., Santolino 
(2010)), several other studies aim at answering the question why plaintiffs lose appeals (see, e.g., Clermont 
and Eisenberg (2001) and Eisenberg and Farber (2013)). For European competition policy, Günster et al. 
(2010) provide an empirical analysis of all European Court of Appeal Rulings of horizontal, vertical, abuse of 
dominance, licensing as well as joint ventures cases between 1957 and 2004. They find, inter alia, that the 
number of pleas positively (negatively) influences the probability of receiving partial (complete) annulment 
and that cases with a high number of judges are more likely to result in a complete annulment. In addition, 
they show that the probability of filing an appeal is significantly influenced by the length of the Commission 
decision, the number of accepted complaints, the number of judges and whether the case is grouped into one 
case or not. In a related paper, Carree et al. (2010) empirically investigate determinants of appealing EC 
decisions on case and firm level using a similar dataset. They identify the level of fine, the decision length 
and the number of parties to which the decision is addressed as significant drivers of the decision to file an 
appeal. 
9  In the words of Shavell (1995, p. 386) it is socially desirable to invest further in the accuracy of the appeals 
process until ‘… the increase in costs is outweighed by the increase in the expected gain, that is, the increase 
in the probability of reversal of error multiplied by the social harm from error”. 
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they believe that the decision is actually erroneous.10 Due to the substantial societal costs that 
are created by such forms of abusive behavior – such as, e.g., delays in decision making at the 
appellate court level – he suggests to impose sanctions on frivolous appeals in order to ‘… 
protect both litigants and the ability of the federal appellate courts to decide cases in an 
expeditious and fair manner’ (Martineau (1984), p. 845).   
 
2.2. The appeals process and its duration 
Although it is apparent that the optimal duration of an appeals process depends on its detailed 
aims and implemented structures, it still adds value to discuss the general importance of the 
duration of an appeals process for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public 
policy makers.11 From a firm’s perspective, the duration of the appeals process determines the 
respective costs associated to it. Ceteris paribus, the longer the appeals process the more 
expensive it becomes in terms of both in-house human resources spent as well as salaries for 
external lawyers. Furthermore, the longer the appeals process, the greater the uncertainty the 
firm has to cope with, e.g., with respect to the correctness of the decision in general or the size 
of the fine in particular. Ceteris paribus, such an increased uncertainty may, e.g., result in the 
delay or even the termination of planned investment projects that likely would have increased 
social welfare (e.g., through increased innovation activities).    
 Turning from firms to (social welfare-maximizing) policy makers, their key aim is to 
assure an optimal duration (and scope) of the appeals process. On the one hand, if any appeals 
decision would take a prohibitively long time span, say twenty years, firms would refrain 
from appealing due to, e.g., the substantial amount of labor costs accrued and – as a 
consequence – the constitutional order would be at risk as firms are taken the factual 
possibility to defend themselves against (possibly arbitrary) decisions by public authorities or 
courts. Furthermore, as soon as fine payments are involved, the longer the respective 
investigation period, the longer tax payers have to wait to profit from the collected fine 
payments. Last but not least, longer investigation periods delay possible private enforcement 
activities thereby weakening the deterrent effect of antitrust laws generally.   
 On the other hand, however, guaranteeing a very short duration of the appeals process 
would either demand substantial investments in additional court capacities (thereby boosting 
                                                          
10  See Ormosi (2012) for a discussion of the strategic use of appeals in the context of merger control. 
11  We are not aware of any (detailed) theoretical or empirical paper that focuses either on the duration of the 
appeals process in general or its determinants in particular. Hüschelrath et al. (2013) assess determinants of 
the duration of investigations by a public authority (i.e., the European Commission) in European cartel cases. 
However, as the majority of key characteristics of these decisions are identical for all cartel firm groups 
(within a certain cartel), the respective analysis had to be conducted on the broad cartel level (rather than the 
more detailed cartel group level as done in our empirical analysis below).   
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enforcement costs) or would increase the likelihood of erroneous decisions (harming the 
deterrent effect of competition laws). Furthermore, a very short appeals process may increase 
the incentives of firms to file frivolous appeals (to make use of the still positive probability 
that the appellate court may (accidentally) improve the decision from their perspective).    
 Although it is beyond the scope of this article to balance these different cost- and benefit-
related influences in a theoretical model to arrive at an optimal duration of an appeals process, 
our empirical assessment of the actual drivers of its duration below is likely to provide useful 
insights for public policy makers in the fine-tuning of the appeals process. In particular, by 
identifying key drivers of the duration of the appeals process in the past, policy makers can 
build on these empirical results if they come to the (political) decision that the duration of the 
appeals process must be either increased or decreased to reach the desired welfare-optimal 
solution.     
 
2.3. The appeals process in European cartel cases  
Given the various alternative structures of an appeals process sketched in the previous 
sections, it becomes apparent that a meaningful empirical analysis has to be based on a 
detailed characterization of the specific appeals process under investigation. Under EU 
competition law in general and for EC cartel cases in particular, the appellate court 
proceedings can be either one- or two-stage. At the first stage, a cartel member that believes 
to have serious concerns with a (fining) decision of the EC can file an appeal with the General 
Court (GC) of the European Union.12 The GC – previously known as the Court of First 
Instance (CFI) – is composed of at least one judge from each member state. According to 
Article 254 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), judges are 
appointed ‘by common accord of the governments of the member states’ for a renewable term 
of six years. The GC sits in chambers of usually three or five judges. Substantively, four main 
categories of argument can broadly be distinguished in an appeal against an EC cartel 
decision: fine levels, procedural aspects, facts/standard of proof aspects, and substantive 
assessment issues.13 In any case, the first-stage appeal must be initiated within two months of 
the earlier; either the publication of the Commission’s decision or the notification of the firm 
group (Art. 263 TFEU). 
                                                          
12  See the consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, Official Journal of the 
European Union, 2010/C 177/02. 
13  According to Camesasca et al. (2013), appeals against cartel decisions often aim at obtaining a fine reduction 
rather than an annulment of the fine (basically because it is rather unlikely that a firm was wrongly convicted 
for its participation in a cartel by the EC). 
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 Generally, the GC not only has the power to annul, reduce or increase the fines imposed by 
the EC; it also has full jurisdiction to review the entire Commission decision (including a 
repetition of the full assessment process). In practice, however, the GC usually focuses on an 
assessment of the factors linked to the correct application of the respective law provisions 
such as cartel duration, the gravity of the infringement or the application of the leniency 
program (see Geradin and Henry (2005) or Harding and Gibbs (2005)). Typically, the GC 
does not aim at replacing the Commission’s assessment of evidence with its own. 
 At the second stage of the appeals process in EC cartel cases, judgments of the GC can be 
appealed before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) by the unsuccessful party, i.e., either the 
convicted firm, the EC itself or both. The ECJ is the highest European appellate court and also 
has the power to annul, reduce or increase the fines imposed by the GC. However, in its 
proceedings, it limits itself to questions of law and has no jurisdiction to (re-)review the facts 
and analyze the evidence that the GC used to support its findings and decision.  
 Before we turn to a discussion of the determinants of the duration of the appeals process in 
European cartel cases, we briefly would like to complement our general description of the 
appeals process in European cartel cases with actual data. For this purpose, Figure 1 shows 
both the number of convicted firms groups14 and the number of appeals15 from 2000 to 2012.  
 
Figure 1: Number of convicted cartel groups and number of first- and second-stage appeals 
(adjudicated and pending), 2000-2012 
 
                                                          
14  Groups of firms were formed according to the respective EC decisions, i.e., firms within a group are linked 
through ownership and are jointly liable for cartel fines. As a consequence, in most years, there are more 
cartel groups who decided to file an appeal than convicted cartels.    
15  Please note that the ‘number of appeals’ values (in Figures 1 and 2 only) correspond to the year in which the 
original EC decision on the cartel was made, i.e., a case decided by the EC in 2001 and finally ruled by the 
GC/ECJ in 2004 is counted in Figure 1 as appeal in the year 2001.  
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As shown in Figure 1, the number of convicted cartel groups experienced a substantial 
increase from 2003 to 2007, followed by a rather erratic development in the years after. The 
number of appeals largely follows the developments of the number of convicted groups, 
however, the respective percentages of convicted groups to adjudicated appeals fluctuates 
from 26 percent in 2000 to 109 percent in 2006. In sum, from a total of 523 convicted groups, 
325 decided to appeal the decision of the EC at the GC (about 62 percent). 
 Complementary to a general quantitative characterization of the appeals process in 
European cartel cases, it is important to provide some additional information on the relevance 
of second-stage appeals. In this respect, Figure 2 displays the share of first-stage appeals that 
enter the second-stage appellate court. 
 
Figure 2: Share of first-stage appeals that enter the second-stage appellate court, 2000-2012 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the share of first-stage appeals that enter the second-stage appellate 
court fluctuates from 12 percent in 2009 to 60 percent in 2007. Interestingly, the large 
majority of second-stage appeals are filed by the firms (not the EC). In sum, from a total of 
325 convicted groups that decided to file a first-stage appeal, 117 (36 percent) ended up in the 
second-stage (either by their own decision or due to an appeal by the EC).  
 Although not shown in the two figures, it is interesting to add that the success rates, i.e., 
either a fine annulment or fine reduction for the convicted firms, diverge substantially 
between the two stages. While in sum 109 of the 325 first-stage appeals were successful 
(about 34 percent), the respective numbers drop substantially for second-stage appeals with 
only 6 successful out of 117 second-stage appeals leading to a success rate of about 5 percent.    
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3. Determinants of the duration of the appeals process in European cartel cases  
In this section, we develop hypotheses on possible determinants of the duration of the appeals 
process in European cartel cases. We differentiate between five sets of explanatory variables: 
authority-related, court-related, appeals-related, fine-related and group-related. 
 
Authority-related determinants 
A first set of variables relate to characteristics of the case while handled by the European 
Commission. First, as the GC – the first-stage appellate court – has to review the case, it 
appears straightforward to assume a correlation between the duration of the investigation by 
the EC and the subsequent investigation by the GC (as a detailed assessment of a complex 
case is likely to cause a longer investigation length on both stages). Second, a related 
explanatory variable focuses on the time span between the cartel breakdown and the start of 
the investigation by the EC. Here, it is straightforward to assume that the longer the respective 
time span, the more difficult it becomes for both the EC and the GC to gather and/or interpret 
the respective proof on both the existence and the scope of the cartel agreement thereby 
increasing the duration of the investigation. Third, the speed of the investigation also depends 
on the clearness of the respective rules and regulations both the EC and the appellate courts 
are committed to apply. In this respect, it can be assumed that the publication of guidelines 
such as the 2006 EC Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines have not only improved the 
transparency of the decisions but consequently also had a negative  impact on the average 
duration of the investigations. 
 
Court-related determinants 
A second group of variables relates to characteristics of the courts committed to handle the 
respective appeal. Although it appears obvious that the performance of the court (measured in 
the accuracy and quickness of its decisions) depends on multiple factors such as its 
organizational structure or the education standard (and practical experience) of its employees, 
it is – due to data constraints – rather difficult to explicitly include such possible drivers into 
an empirical investigation. However, a potentially key court-related driver of the duration of 
the investigation is rather easy to include: the number of cases that have to be handled by the 
court over a certain time period. For example, if there are only three appeals cases to be 
handled in one year, it can be expected that the GC/ECJ is (on average) able to close those 
cases quicker than in an otherwise comparable year with ten cases. In other words, the current 
10 
 
workload of the GC/ECJ appears to be an important determinant of the duration of the 
investigations.  
 
Appeals-related determinants 
A third group of explanatory variables of appeals duration refers to the appeal as such. In this 
respect, it is, first, straightforward to assume that the overall duration of the appeals process 
depends on the fact whether the appeal is only filed with the first-stage appellate court (i.e., 
the GC) or whether the case is taken to the second and final stage and being assessed by the 
ECJ. Ceteris paribus, it can be expected that the overall duration increases if a second-stage 
investigation takes place. Furthermore, if such a second stage is entered, the duration of 
investigation might also depend on the party that decided to appeal the first-stage appellate 
court decision: either the EC and/or the respective firm(s). Second, the duration of the appeals 
process might depend on the number of pleas put forward as, ceteris paribus, it takes more 
time to investigate the relevance and correctness of four different qualitative arguments 
compared to just one argument. Third, it can also be expected that the length of the 
investigation increases as soon as firms demand an annulment of the fine rather than simply a 
fine reduction. Ceteris paribus, it can be assumed that the more drastic step of a fine 
annulment takes more time to investigate with the necessary accuracy than a comparably 
simple fine reduction.        
 
Fine-related determinants 
A fourth group of variables relates to characteristics of the fine issued by the EC. First, the 
existence and application of a leniency program (that basically offers fine reductions in 
exchange for full cooperation with the EC) can be expected to reduce the duration of the 
appeals process because the EC has more detailed information on the case and is therefore 
able to close it sooner. We therefore expect the investigation duration to decrease with the 
level of leniency discount granted to a group, i.e., the level of cooperation of a group with the 
EC. Second, according to the EC Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines from 2006, the 
Commission is entitled to either increase or decrease the basic amount of the fine as soon as 
either aggravating or mitigating circumstances16 are present. As not only the presence of such 
factors but especially the size of the (positive or negative) discounts granted by the EC are 
                                                          
16  Aggravating circumstances considered by the EC are, e.g., repeat offences, refusal to cooperate with the EC 
or the role of leader in an infringement. Mitigating circumstances, however, include, e.g., the provision of 
evidence that the infringement was terminated as soon as the EC intervened or proof that the anti-competitive 
conduct has been authorized or encouraged by public authorities or by legislation. 
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likely to be subject to some degree of discretion, it appears likely that the respective decision 
making extends the duration of the appeals process significantly.       
 
Group-related determinants 
A fifth and last group of variables refers to certain characteristics of the groups of firms who 
participated in the cartel. In this respect, we hypothesize that, first, the number of countries 
represented in one group may have an impact on the duration of the appeals process basically 
because the larger the number of countries the more difficult it becomes for the GC to receive 
the respective information necessary to decide on a certain case. Second, we also assume, for 
comparable reasons, that the number of firms within one group may have an impact on the 
duration of the appeals process. Ceteris paribus, it appears easier for a court to investigate an 
appeal submitted by a group consisting of two firms rather than to investigate a similar appeal 
with five firms in a group. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
In this section, we present our empirical analysis to study the determinants of the duration of 
the appeals process for European cartel cases. While Section 4.1 characterizes our empirical 
model, the subsequent Section 4.2 describes the construction of the data set and presents the 
corresponding descriptive statistics. Section 4.3 then follows with a presentation and 
discussion of our estimation results before Section 4.4 closes the fourth section with the 
derivation of several implications for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public 
policy makers. 
 
4.1. Empirical model 
In order to investigate the determinants of the duration of the appeals process, we estimate the 
following OLS model: 
ܦݑݎ_݀݁ܿ݅ݏ݅݋݊ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵᇱܣݑݐ݄݋ݎ݅ݐݕ ൅ ߚଶᇱܥ݋ݑݎݐ ൅ ߚଷᇱܣ݌݌݈݁ܽݏ ൅ ߚସᇱܨ݅݊݁ ൅ ߚହᇱܩݎ݋ݑ݌ ൅ ݑ 
The dependent variable Dur_decision equals the overall duration (in months) needed by the 
two courts to decide the respective case. The independent variables included into our model 
refer to the five sets of variables identified in Section 3 above as potential drivers of the 
duration of the appeals process: authority-related (Authority), court-related (Court), appeals-
related (Appeal), fine-related (Fine) and group-related (Group). The error term is denoted by 
u. 
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 In order to take account of the institutional details of the appeals process in the European 
Union with the first-stage appellate court investigating the substance of the case and the 
second-stage appellate court only deciding on the correct application of the law, we will 
estimate the described model, in a first step, by applying it to the entire data set and therefore 
both stages of the appeals process. In a second step, we will run the same estimations 
separately for the two stages. In these estimations, the dependent variables are then given by 
the duration of the appeals processes on the two separate stages. Introducing such a 
differentiation will allow us to test whether the two stages structurally differ in terms of 
drivers of the duration of the respective proceedings.  
 
4.2. Construction of the data set and descriptive statistics 
The raw data set used in this article contains information on all cartel cases and appeals 
decisions decided by the European Commission (EC), the General Court (GC) of the 
European Union and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) between 2000 and 2012. The data 
were collected from decisions and press releases published by the EC in the course of its 
investigations as well as from judgment documents provided by the online platform CVRIA.17 
The data set combines case-specific, firm group-specific and firm-specific information. Firm 
groups were formed according to the respective EC decisions, i.e., firms within one group are 
linked through ownership and are jointly liable for cartel fines. For our empirical analysis we 
use data on the group level rather than on the firm level because most variables do not differ 
substantially between single firms within a certain group.18  Using firm level data would 
therefore result in an unjustified multiplication of the sample size without providing any 
additional information. The data set is restricted to firm groups that decided to challenge the 
respective EC decisions and for which the final court decision was already available.19 In 
total, the data set combines information on 234 firm-groups from 63 cartel cases.20 Table 1 
                                                          
17  See http://curia.europa.eu for further information. 
18  In some cases, several firms within the same firm group decided to file separate appeals with the GC/ECJ. In 
those cases, aggregate variables on the group level were created, i.e., the duration of the appeals process for 
the entire group is given by the average duration of the separate appeals.  
19  Appeals that were still pending at the time of the finalization of the data set (in February 2014) were 
excluded entirely from the empirical analysis in order to avoid biases.  
20  It is worth noting that – for our empirical analysis – we divided some of the decided EC cartel cases into 
several separate cases, basically because some EC decisions cover several distinct cases within one judgment 
(e.g., as they either refer to similar product markets or the same product market in different geographical 
regions). The creation of such distinct cases is important in order to aggregate our group-related variables 
appropriately. The number of cartel cases included in our empirical analysis is 54 according to the EC 
statistics (rather than 63 according to our classification). 
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summarizes descriptive statistics of the collected variables. A detailed list of variables is 
provided in Table 3 in the Annex. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max Obs 
Authority-related variables           
Dur_investigation 52.2051 21.0254 7 114 234 
Dur_detection 0.9359 16.0701 -39 51 234 
Fine_guideline_06 0.1709 0.3773 0 1 234 
Court-related variables 
Dur_decision 56.3889 16.6699 5 102 234 
Dur_decision_GC 48.8752 13.7932 5 81 234 
Dur_decision_ECJ 15.8238 11.6097 0 56 96 
No_appeals_12m_GC 30.5513 18.6918 1 72 234 
No_appeals_12m_ECJ 17.6146 13.5136 0 51 234 
Appeals-related variables 
Twostages_ec 0.1068 0.3096 0 1 234 
Twostages_firmgroup 0.4103 0.4929 0 1 234 
Appeal_success 0.4658 0.4999 0 1 234 
No_pleas 5.5996 3.1945 1 20 234 
Fine_annulment 0.9231 0.2670 0 1 234 
Fine-related variables 
Leniency_reduction 0.1278 0.1681 0 1 234 
Aggrav_circum 0.2308 0.4222 0 1 234 
Mitig_circum 0.2265 0.4195 0 1 234 
Group-related variables 
No_countries 1.4829 0.9548 1 8 234 
No_firms 1.9316 1.4515 1 12 234 
 
Although it appears dispensable to provide a detailed discussion of the descriptive statistics of 
all variables shown in Table 1, we would like to point to a few key insights. First, it is shown 
that the duration of an investigation by the European Commission lasts on average about 52 
months with a spectrum from 7 months to 114 months.21 Second, interestingly, the duration of 
the entire appeals process is similar with an average duration of 56 months and minimum and 
maximum values of 5 months and 102 months, respectively. However, the split between a 
first- and a second-stage appeals process reveals that the latter (about 16 months) is 
substantially shorter than the former (about 49 months) reflecting the differences in their aims 
and scopes discussed in Section 2.3 above. Third, Table 1 reveals that there is substantial 
variation in the number of appeals submitted to the GC (ECJ) within 12 months before a 
                                                          
21  Please note that the value of -39 months as minimum value for the Dur_detection variable is explained by a 
case in which the cartel continued to operate after the EC started an investigation.  
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certain appeal. On average, the GC (ECJ) has to handle 30 (18) separate cases with 1 (0) and 
72 (51) delineating the spectrum.  
 
4.3. Estimation results 
In this section, we present the key results of our empirical analysis. We follow the structure of 
the derivation of our hypotheses in Section 3 and differentiate between five sets of 
explanatory variables: authority-related, court-related, appeals-related, fine-related and group-
related. Within these groups of variables, we will discuss the implications of the results of all 
three regression results shown in Table 2: both appeals stages together and separate estimates 
for stage 1 (General Court of the European Union) and stage 2 (European Court of Justice).  
 Starting off with the authority-related determinants, Table 2 above reveals that only the 
duration of first-stage appellate proceedings is increasing with an enlarging time span 
between cartel breakdown and beginning of the EC investigation thereby confirming our 
hypothesis developed above. While the duration of the EC investigation is found to have no 
significant impact on the duration of either first- or second-stage appellate court proceedings, 
the implementation of the EC Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines in 2006 had a 
substantial effect: the average duration of a first-stage court investigation decreases by about 
12 months in first-stage appellate court proceedings and 11 months in second-stage appellate 
court proceedings.  
  Turning to the court-related determinants, we find that the number of appeals submitted 
within 12 months before an appeal has a highly significant impact on the duration of first-
stage appellate court decisions. The more cases are handled by the GC in parallel, the longer 
the average duration of the proceedings. Interestingly, a corresponding effect cannot be found 
for second-stage appellate court decisions. 
 The appeals-related determinants of the duration of appellate court proceedings also reveal 
diverging results for the first and the second stage. While the estimation of both stages reveal 
that a second-stage court proceeding increases the duration of the entire appeals process by 
about 11 months when the EC has initiated the appeal and about 17 months in cases in which 
the firms appealed, the separate regressions of the two stages reveal that only the fine 
annulment variable shows a significantly negative effect on the duration of first-stage 
appellate proceedings. Interestingly, the number of pleas filed by the parties does not 
significantly influence the duration of appeals proceedings. Likewise, successful appeals 
show no significant difference in investigation length compared to unsuccessful appeals, 
suggesting that the appeals are treated equally by the courts irrespective of the outcome.  
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            Table 2: Estimation results 
 Both stages 
(GC and ECJ) 
Stage 1: GC Stage 2: ECJ 
Authority-related variables      
  Dur_investigation -0.0671 (-1.64) -0.0376 (-1.01) -0.0927 (-1.27) 
 Dur_detection 0.191*** (3.51) 0.210*** (4.70) 0.0179 (0.19) 
 Fine_guideline_06 -19.55*** (-7.80) -12.36*** (-5.37) -10.57*** (-2.64) 
Court-related variable       
 No_appeals_12m 0.196*** (3.73) 0.188*** (4.05) -0.0878 (-0.93) 
Appeals-related variables       
 Twostages_ec 11.33*** (4.24)     
 Twostages_firmgroup 16.58*** (8.59)     
 Appeal_success -1.352 (-0.69) -2.158 (-1.08) 3.668 (1.28) 
 No_pleas -0.279 (-0.95) -0.332 (-1.19) 0.182 (0.54) 
 Fine_annulment -12.72*** (-4.10) -11.76*** (-3.98) -4.210 (-1.29) 
Fine-related variables       
 Leniency_reduction -11.03* (-1.94) -10.09* (-1.80) -4.591 (-0.66) 
 Aggrav_circum -0.954 (-0.39) -0.235 (-0.09) -1.082 (-0.35) 
 Mitig_circum -4.515* (-1.74) -3.068 (-1.21) -5.991* (-1.71) 
Group-related variables       
 No_countries 1.059 (0.55) 1.389 (0.64) -0.200 (-0.11) 
 No_firms -1.106 (-0.74) -0.502 (-0.30) -1.012 (-0.71) 
Cons 66.21*** (15.71) 61.69*** (16.00) 30.11*** (4.95) 
N 234 234 96 
R2 0.502 0.295 0.296 
adj. R2 0.471 0.257 0.194 
             t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Turning to the fine-related determinants, we find that the higher the level of percentage 
reduction of the basic amount of the fine due to a leniency application – a measure of the 
degree of cooperation of the group with the Commission – the higher the reduction in the 
duration of first-stage appellate court proceedings thereby confirming our hypothesis derived 
in Section 3 above. Interestingly, the presence of mitigating factors only lead to a reduction in 
the duration of second-stage appellate court proceedings while it has no significant effect in 
first-stage proceedings.   
 Last but not least, the results for the group-related determinants of the duration of 
appellate court proceedings have to be discussed. As revealed by Table 2, neither the number 
of countries nor the number of firms has a significant effect on the duration of either first- or 
second-stage appellate court proceedings.  
 In sum, our empirical results reveal that the speed of a first-stage appellate court decision 
depends on the court’s appeals-related workload, the complexity of the case, the degree of 
cooperation by the firms involved and the clarity of applied rules and regulations. 
Interestingly, second-stage appellate court decision appears to be largely unaffected by those 
drivers and only show a significant reduction in the duration after the implementation of the 
EC Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines in 2006 and the existence of mitigating factors 
in the calculation of the final fine. While on the surface, this finding appears to be surprising, 
the above description of the appeals process with the first-stage appellate court investigating 
the substance of the case and the second-stage appellate court only investigating the correct 
application of the law provides more than an explanation why the (substantially different) 
average durations of the two stages are found to be affected by largely different drivers.   
 
4.4. Implications for firms and public policy makers 
Based on the description of our empirical results in the preceding section, we will now turn to 
a discussion of their implications for both firms that plan to file an appeal as well as public 
policy makers. Assuming that a firm as rational decision maker decides to file an appeal if the 
net present value of the investment can be expected to be positive, the question is posed how 
our empirical results help in conducting such an assessment. Ceteris paribus, our results, first, 
suggest that special types of (more complex older) cases can be expected to cause a 
substantially longer investigation length thereby reducing the net present value of the 
respective investment in the appeals process. The same conclusion is true in a situation in 
which a certain case is added to an already high workload of the GC thereby triggering longer 
investigation lengths and consequently higher costs for the respective firm. However, if the 
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firm participated in the leniency program of the EC, it can expect to have a significantly 
shorter investigation length thereby increasing the incentives to file an appeal.  
 Although on the surface, it appears straightforward to assume that firms have an interest in 
short appeals processes for the cost-related reasons discussed in Section 2 above, the rising 
importance of private antitrust enforcement in Europe questions this assumption. Due to the 
fact that cartel damage claims in Europe are typically filed as follow-on cases, the appeals 
process factually delays the beginning of such trials and therefore provides an incentive for 
former cartel members to (frivolously) extend the length of the appeals process (or even to 
initiate one in the first place).   
 Turning to the implications of our results for public policy makers, they, first, suggest that 
the provision of clear rules and regulations has a strong positive effect on procedural 
efficiency reflected in substantially shorter investigation lengths. In particular, the 
implementation of the EC Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines in 2006 is found to have 
such an effect suggesting that further clarifications of administrative procedures have the 
potential to reduce the duration of proceedings further. 
 Second, our results suggest that specific forms of cooperation between the authority or 
court and the respective firms have the potential to increase procedural efficiency through 
quicker judgments. In particular, the introduction of the leniency program and therewith the 
possibility for firms to receive fine reductions in exchange for full cooperation with the 
authority led to a substantial reduction in the duration of first-stage appellate court 
proceedings suggesting that increases in the attractiveness of the leniency program design or 
its implementation are likely to further promote the speed of appellate court proceedings (at 
the cost of a decreased deterrence effect of anti-cartel law enforcement).  
 Third, our results also confirm the expectation that the capacity and capacity utilization of 
the first-stage appellate court system is a key determinant of procedural efficiency. The more 
cases the court has to review, the longer the respective duration of the proceedings suggesting 
that policy makers have the possibility to improve investigation speed by simply increasing 
the number of judges (or other bottleneck resources) in the court system. However, 
incremental costs and benefits of such a step need to be compared to assure that net social 
welfare is actually likely to be increased. Such an assessment would have to include the 
effects of a higher/lower number of judges on qualitative aspects of the proceedings and 
decisions, i.e., first and foremost the probability and severity of legal errors.22      
                                                          
22  For example, hiring additional judges would likely not only affect the quantity side but also the quality side, 
e.g., because a larger number of judges would allow a higher degree of specialization thereby promoting the 
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5. Conclusion 
It is undisputed that an efficient court system is not only an important cornerstone in the 
creation and maintenance of a workable and sustainable judicial system but also of 
tremendous importance in attaining the more general aim of a solid implementation of a 
constitutional order. Although admittedly subject to several simplifying assumptions, an 
efficient court system can be thought of maximizing the net social benefit by making an 
optimal number of correct decisions with the lowest possible use of resources. For example, a 
court that (regularly) reaches correct decisions in three months would be considered more 
efficient than a court that comes to the same correct decisions after four months.  
 Although it is obvious that – in complex cases – the duration of the proceeding may be 
correlated with the accuracy and correctness of the decision, i.e., longer decision making 
processes (e.g., due to a cautious review of all pieces of evidence) may reduce the likelihood 
of erroneous decisions, it also cannot be ignored that the duration of a court investigation is of 
great importance for both firms and society. For example, if any appeals decision would take 
a prohibitively long time span, say twenty years, firms would refrain from appealing due to, 
e.g., the substantial amount of labor costs accrued and – as a consequence – the constitutional 
order would be at risk as firms are taken the factual possibility to defend themselves against 
(possibly arbitrary) decisions by public authorities or courts. 
 Against this background, we use data of 234 firm groups that participated in 63 cartels 
convicted by the European Commission between 2000 and 2012 to investigate the 
determinants of the duration of the subsequent one- or two-stage appeals process. We find that 
while the speed of the first-stage appellate court decision depends on the court’s appeals-
related workload, the complexity of the case, the degree of cooperation by the firms involved 
and the clarity of the applied rules and regulations, the second-stage appellate court 
proceedings appear to be largely unaffected by those drivers. Our empirical results do not 
only provide valuable insights for firms in their decision to file an appeal – as the duration of 
the appellate court proceedings must be considered as a major cost driver – but especially 
point to several parameters policy makers can vary if they believe that it is in the public 
interest to either increase or decrease the speed of appellate court proceedings. Examples 
include changes in the capacity and/or degree of specialization of the appellate courts, the 
clarity of rules and regulations (such as fine guidelines) or the provision of incentives for 
former cartel members to support the public authority (and subsequently the court(s)) in a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
speed of proceedings through the realization of learning economies (and as a measure complementary to 
improved training programs for judges in economics; see, e.g., Baye and Wright (2011)).   
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complete assessment of both the existence and the scope of the cartel agreement at hand (e.g., 
through a leniency program).  
 Our empirical results together with a few identified shortcomings suggest several avenues 
for future research. One interesting area in this respect is field studies in appellate courts to 
learn more on the real bottlenecks in their everyday investigation work. Such studies are 
likely to allow the inclusion of further variables (possibly) reaching an even better 
explanatory value of an empirical analysis. Another fruitful area of future research is 
international comparisons of investigation lengths and their determinants. Although it is 
obvious that legislative (and related) differences across countries will complicate such an 
endeavor, benchmarking exercises would still enable efficiency comparisons and would 
therefore allow basing policy conclusions on more robust foundations. A third and last 
promising area of future research is to complement our efficiency measure of an appellate 
court system – the duration of the appeals process – with richer measures that explicitly take 
the relationship between investigation length and the likelihood (and severity) of errors (i.e., 
the quality of the respective decisions) into account. In this respect, it would also be important 
to learn more on the motivations of firms to file an appeal. The range of possible reasons 
reaches from the true belief that the decision of the Commission was wrong via an attempt to 
receive some degree of fine reduction up to the filing of frivolous appeals that, e.g., aim at 
delaying (follow-on) private enforcement activities of customers harmed by the typically 
elevated prices set by the former cartel members.  
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Annex 
 
Table 3: List of variables  
Variable Description 
Authority-related variables   
Duration_investigation Duration of investigation by the EC, in months 
Duration_detection Time span between cartel breakdown and start of EC investigation, in months 
Fine_guideline_06 =1 if group was fined under the 2006 Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines 
Court-related variables   
Duration_decision_total Overall duration of appeals decision (GC and ECJ), in months 
Duration_decision_GC Duration of appeals decision by GC, in months 
Duration_decision_ECJ Duration of appeals decision by ECJ, in months 
No_appeals_12m_GC Number of appeals submitted to GC within 12 months before appeal 
No_appeals_12m_ECJ Number of appeals submitted to ECJ within 12 months before appeal 
Appeals-related variables   
Twostages_ec =1 if the appeals decision is challenged by the EC before the European Court of Justice 
Twostages_firmgroup =1 if the appeals decision is challenged by the group before the European Court of Justice 
Appeal_success =1 if group received a fine reduction due to appeal 
No_pleas Number of pleas put forward in the appeal 
Fine_annulment =1 if group strived for an annulment of the fine rather than for a fine reduction 
Fine-related variables   
Leniency_reduction Leniency reduction granted for group, in percent of final fine 
Aggrav_circum =1 if aggravating circumstances were taken into account in the EC decision 
Mitig_circum =1 if mitigating circumstances were taken into account in the EC decision 
Group-related variables   
No_countries Number of firms within group 
No_firms Number of different countries within group 
 
 
